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Abstract
We incorporate trade in tasks a` la Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) into a small open
economy version of the theory of firm organization of Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine
how offshoring affects the way firms organize. We show that the offshoring of production
tasks leads firms to reorganize with a more decentralized management, improving the com-
petitiveness of the offshoring firms. We show further that the offshoring of managerial tasks
relaxes the constraint on managers but toughens competition, and thus has an ambiguous
impact on the level of decentralized management and CEO wages of the offshoring firms.
In sufficiently open economies, however, managerial offshoring unambiguously leads to more
decentralized management and to larger CEO wages. We test the predictions of the model
based on original firm level data we designed and collected of 660 Austrian and German
multinational firms with 2200 subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. We find that offshoring firms
are 33.4% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. We find further that the average
fraction of managers offshored reduces the level of decentralized management by 3.1%, but
increases the level of decentralized management by 4% in industries with a level of openness
above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution. Lastly, we find that one additional
offshored manager lowers CEO wages relative to workers by 4.9%.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, the nature of international trade has been changing. Modern economic
commerce involves movements across international boundaries—but often within the boundaries
of the firm. It is often characterized by a ‘war for talent’ rather than a ‘war for market shares’.
Firms engaged in international activities have met these challenges of the new features of world
trade by organizing production in an international value chain, by decentralizing their system
of command into flatter corporate hierarchies, by making human capital the new stakeholder
of the firm, and by compensating their CEOs with skyrocketing sums. In this paper, we ask:
have offshoring and ‘trade in tasks’ been the driving forces behind these observed changes in
corporations?1
In an international value chain or ‘trade in tasks’, firms geographically separate different
production stages across the world economy to exploit differences in production costs. Trade
in tasks is also discussed in the literature under the headings ‘slicing the value chain’, ‘vertical
specialization’, ‘fragmentation’, or ‘offshoring’. According to one estimate, such vertical spe-
cialization accounts for one-third of the increase in world trade since 1970 (see Hummels et al.,
2001) and intra-firm imports account for between 22%–69% of total imports between western
and eastern Europe (see Marin, 2006). World investment outflows increased by a factor of 4.5
between 1990 and 2005: from 202 billion US$ to 916 billion US$ (see World Investment Report
(2006), UNCTAD).2
Data on the changing nature of the corporation have become available only recently. Rajan
and Wulf (2006) and Marin and Verdier (2014) document that firms in the US, Germany, and
Austria shifted to a more decentralized organization over time. Marin (2008) and Marin and
Verdier (2014) show that firms in the larger economy, Germany, are more decentralized compared
to firms in the smaller economy, Austria. Bloom, Sadun and van Reenen (2010) report that firms
in the US, the UK, and Northern Europe have the most decentralized organization, while firms
in Asian countries are the most centralized.
The literature on organization and trade has so far examined how international trade in final
goods affects the internal organization of firms. Marin and Verdier (2008, 2014) and Caliendo
1For the new corporation, see The Economist (2006) and Marin (2008).
2For the new features of globalization, see Hummels et al. (2001), Feenstra (1998), and Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). For the new international division of labour in Europe, see Marin (2006). For a recent estimate
of global value added chains, see Johnson and Noguera (2012).
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and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) show, based, respectively, on a Krugman (1980) model, a Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) model, and a Melitz (2003) model of international trade, that North–North
trade induces firms to reorganize their production and to decentralize decision making power to
lower levels of management. Marin and Verdier (2012) examine the organizational implications
of trade integration within a framework of a Helpman and Krugman (1985) model of North–
South trade in which countries differ in factor endowments. They show that North–South trade
leads to the emergence of the ‘talent firm’, in which human capital becomes the new stakeholder.
These papers do not consider how offshoring or trade in tasks affects the firm organization of
offshoring firms. As the above figures show, however, trade in tasks and intra-firm trade have
increased much more sharply than trade in final goods in the last two decades, making offshoring
an important candidate for being a driver of organizational change. This will be particularly the
case if one takes into account that the relocation of firm activities to other countries typically
involves a major reorganization of the activity that remains in offshoring firms in the North.
Thus, offshoring and the reorganization of firms appear to go hand in hand.3
In this paper, we incorporate trade in tasks a` la Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) (here-
inafter referred to as GRH) into a small open economy version of the theory of firm organization
of Marin and Verdier (2012) (hereinafter referred to as MV) to explore how the offshoring of
production tasks and managerial tasks affects the internal organization of the offshoring firms
in a small open economy. By merging these two models, our paper contributes in several ways
to the recent literature on globalization and the organization of firms. First, we show that the
offshoring to the South of production tasks by Northern firms unambiguously increases firms’
profits and, thereby, induces firms to reorganize to a more decentralized management in which
power is allocated to the skilled manager in the Northern firm. In GRH, this effect is absent, as
they do not consider a firm’s choice of organizational form. However, relocating tasks to other
countries typically involves a major reorganization in the offshoring firm, resulting in productiv-
ity gains that go above and beyond the mere discovery of cheap production opportunities in the
South. The latter effect is taken into consideration by GRH, which they call labour-augmenting
technological change.4
3One exception is Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), who explore how the formation of international
teams influences the organization of firms and the structure of wages.
4Marin (2011) shows that the discovery of cheap labour in Eastern Europe by German multinational firms
has allowed German affiliate firms in Eastern Europe to cut unit labour costs relative to German parent firms by
over 70%. Amiti and Konings (2007) and Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) quantify the productivity effect from
offshoring for Indonesia and Hungary, respectively.
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Second, we find that Northern firms gain market share from foreign rivals as a result of the
productivity gains from offshoring. The improved competitiveness of Northern firms has been an
important argument in the empirical literature on the labour market effects of offshoring. This
literature argues that offshoring to the South has not led to major job losses in the North because
it has helped Northern firms to gain market share, increasing the demand for labour in Northern
firms. Improved competitiveness as a result of offshoring has so far not been demonstrated in
the literature, neither theoretically nor empirically. In GRH, such a change in competitiveness
in the North cannot arise because they consider a framework with perfect competition.5
Third, Marin and Verdier (2012) show that trade liberalization triggers a ‘war for talent’, as
market entry is constrained by the pool of available managers in the North. Firms compete for
the limited amount of skilled managers available in the North, pushing up the relative wage for
skilled managers. By incorporating ‘trade in tasks’ into Marin and Verdier (2012), we find that
when the country is not too open to foreign competition, the offshoring of skilled managers to the
South may lead to lower relative wages for skilled managers and may induce firms to re-centralize
decision making power to the top management in Northern firms. The offshoring of managerial
tasks to Eastern Europe may explain why the rise in CEO compensation in Germany has been
less pronounced than in the US.6 In the empirical part of this paper, we show that offshoring of
managerial tasks to Eastern Europe has occurred frequently and has been substantial (in 57%
of German and Austrian foreign direct investments with on average 2.63 managers offshored per
investment project). This has contributed to lowering relative CEO wages by between 13% and
18%.
We consider a small open economy with two sectors and two factors of production (workers
and managers). Sector Y produces a homogenous good under perfect competition. Sector X
is monopolistically competitive a` la Helpman and Krugman (1985). In the X-sector, firms
producing a variety of the differentiated good can choose between three types of organization:
centralized P -organization, in which the principal holds formal power in cooperation with the
agent; decentralized A-organization, in which the agent has formal power; and centralized O-
organization, in which the principal runs the firm without cooperation with the agent. There
is free entry into the industry. Workers (low-skilled labour) are used in the production of both
5For the labour market effects of offshoring, see Brainard and Riker (1997), Becker and Muendler (2010), and
Marin (2011). For the increase in export market shares as a result of offshoring, see Marin, Schymik and Tscheke
(2014).
6For the stylized features of the rise in CEO pay in Germany, see Fabbri and Marin (2012).
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products, while managers (highly skilled labour) are only used for entry into the industry. In
other words, firms need to hire a manager to run a firm.
We show that the offshoring of production workers in the differentiated sector unambigiously
increases profits and, as a result, Northern firms delegate decision making power to middle
managers. Intuitively, the offshoring of production workers has two opposing effects on profits.
On the one hand, it lowers the marginal costs of production. On the other hand, it induces
firm entry, increasing competition, which then lowers the firms’ revenues and profits. We show
that in an open economy, the positive productivity effect is always stronger than the negative
competition effect and, as a result, profits unambiguously increase. When profits rise, principals
in firms start to monitor the firm more, potentially destroying the initiative of skilled managers.
When the increase in offshoring is sufficiently large, profits rise and the trade-off between control
and initiative in the firm moves in favour of maintaining the initiative of the skilled manager.
As a result, principals delegate decision-making power to the skilled manager.
We show further that the offshoring of managerial tasks to the South has three distinct
effects. First, it lowers the demand for managers in the North, which relaxes the resource
constraint on managers, lowering their relative wages and the level of profits that firms require
to enter the market (the labour market effect). Second, the lower start-up costs of a firm (recall
that each firm has to hire a manager to start a firm) induce firm entry into the market, which
increases competition and raises the demand for managers, resulting in a rise in the relative wage
of managers (the ‘war for talent’ effect). We show that when the economy is sufficiently open
to international trade, the ‘war for talent’ effect dominates the labour market effect, making
it more likely that Northern firms decentralize management and pay their CEOs higher wages.
We show further that when the economy is sufficiently closed to international trade, the labour
market effect is larger, making it more likely that Northern firms pay their CEOs lower wages
(relative to workers).
We test the predictions of the model using original firm level data we designed and collected
of 660 Austrian and German multinational firms with 2200 subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.
We find that offshoring firms are 33.4% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms (when
we instrument trade in tasks by a ‘standardized foreign input’7). We find further that an
increase in the fraction of managers offshored (in terms of the sample mean) reduces the level
7This instrument is inspired by Antras and Helpman (2008), who argue that offshoring within the firm will be
more prevalent when the foreign input supplier delivers a standardized input with few hold-up problems.
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of decentralized management by 3.1%, but increases its level by 4.0% in sectors with a level
of openness above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution. Lastly, we find that one
additional offshored manager on average lowers the relative wages of executives by 4.9%, with
the labour market effect reducing CEO relative wages by 6.9% and the ‘war for talent’ effect
increasing CEO relative wages by 2%.
The paper is organized in the following sections. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
examines theoretically how the offshoring of production workers and managerial tasks affects
the way a firm organizes. Section 4 describes the firm survey and the empirical results. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy with two goods and two factors of production: skilled and
unskilled labour. The utility function of a representative consumer is given by
U(X,Y ) = XaY 1−a, a ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where Y is a homogenous good and X is a differentiated good:
X =
[∫
i∈Ω
x(i)ρdi+
∫
i′∈Ωm
xm(i
′)ρdi′
]1/ρ
and 0 < ρ < 1.
Here Ω and Ωm represent the set of domestic and foreign varieties, respectively. The homoge-
nous good is produced in a perfectly competitive environment with a linear technology that
requires only unskilled labour. Domestic varieties of the differentiated good are produced under
monopolistic competition with free entry.
2.1 Firm Organization
In modeling the internal organization of a firm producing a variety of the differentiated product
in an international market, we follow Marin and Verdier (2012). We assume that the firm
consists of an owner (the principal P ) and a manager (the agent A). In particular, in each firm
the principal hires a skilled manager to start a firm and employs unskilled workers to produce.
We assume that there are a number of alternative ways to run the firm, that differ in terms
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of production costs and, therefore, payoffs. However, only two of them are worth doing from
the perspective of the principal and the manager. One project has the lowest cost of production
and, thereby, yields the highest possible profit B. The other project is the ‘best project’ for the
manager, yielding the highest possible non-pecuniary benefit b for the manager (e.g. perks or
career concerns). Thus, there is a potential conflict of interest between the principal and the
manager. We denote by αB (α ∈ [0, 1)) the principal’s benefit when the best project for the
manager is implemented. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the manager’s benefit when
the best project for the principal is implemented is zero. Here, α captures the degree of conflict
between the principal and the manager. B and b are supposed to be known ex ante, but the
parties do not know ex ante which project yields which payoff.
To gather information on the payoffs of the projects, the principal uses a low skilled labour
monitoring technology. Specifically, by investing some amount of unskilled labour L, the prin-
cipal learns all the payoffs with probability E = min(1,
√
L) and remains uninformed with
probability 1 − E. Similarly, by exerting some effort ke (k < b), the agent learns the payoffs
of all projects with probability e ∈ [0, e¯] and remains uninformed with probability 1 − e. We
assume that the principal is risk neutral and that the agent is infinitely risk averse with respect
to income. As a result, the agent is not responsive to monetary incentives and receives a fixed
wage q.
We also assume that, among the available projects, there are some with very high negative
payoffs to both the principal and the agent. This assumption implies that choosing a random
project without being informed is not profitable. In particular if the principal and the agent do
not know the payoffs, there is no production. Thus, private information about the payoffs gives
control over the decision to the informed party that, in this case, has ‘real power’ rather than
‘formal power’ in the firm.
In the X-sector, the principals in firms choose between three modes of organization, to
maximize utility: P -organization, A-organization, and O-organization. In P -organization, the
principal has formal power. In A-organization, the principal delegates formal power to the
manager. Finally, in O-organization, the principal also has formal power, but the manager puts
zero effort into learning the payoffs of the available projects (one can think of O-organization as
P -organization with zero effort put in by the manager).
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2.1.1 P -organization
Under P -organization, the principal has formal power. In this case if the principal is fully
informed about the payoffs, then the best project for the principal is implemented and the
principal’s monetary payoff is B, while the manager receives zero. If the principal is uninformed
and the manager is informed, then the manager has real power and suggests her best project
(which is accepted by the principal). The principal receives a monetary payoff αB and the
manager receives the private benefit b. If both the parties remain uninformed, there is no
production.
Hence, the expected payoffs of the principal and the agent are
uP = EB + (1− E)eαB − wE2,
uA = (1− E)eb− ke.
Here, w is the wage rate of unskilled labour (wE2 is the principal’s cost of learning the project
payoffs). The first order conditions of the parties with respect to efforts E and e highlight the
trade-off between control and initiative in the firm. They are
Principal: B(1− αe) = 2wE,
Agent:
 e = e¯ if k ≤ b(1− E),e = 0 otherwise.
The principal invests in more monitoring the higher the monetary payoff B, the larger the
conflict of interest between the principal and the manager (the lower α), and the lower the
manager’s effort e. The agent puts in more effort the higher her benefit b from the project and
the lower the principal’s interference (lower E). Thus, the principal’s control over the firm comes
at the cost of less initiative on the part of the agent.
Marin and Verdier (2012) show that the equilibrium levels of effort under P -organization are
E∗P =
B(1− αe¯)
2w
, e∗P = e¯ if B/w ≤ B˜P (2)
E∗P =
B
2w
, e∗P = 0 if B/w > B˜P ,
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with the cutoff level of profits at which the initiative of the agent is killed being
B˜P =
2(1− k/b)
1− αe¯ .
Note that the case with zero effort put in by the manager corresponds to O-organization.8 Thus,
it is straightforward to show that the expected utility of the principal under P -organization is
u∗P = w (E
∗
P )
2 + e∗PαB. (3)
2.1.2 A-organization
Under A-organization, the principal delegates formal power to the manager. If both parties are
informed, then the best project for the manager is implemented. When the principal is informed
and the agent is uninformed, the principal suggests her preferred project and, thereby, has real
power. The expected payoffs of the principal and the agent are
vP = eαB + (1− e)EB − wE2,
vA = eb− ke.
The first order conditions of the parties with respect to the efforts E and e are
Principal: B(1− e) = 2wE,
Agent: e = e¯,
as b is assumed to be greater than k.
The advantage of delegating formal power to the manager is that the manager has more
incentives to become informed. Specifically, under A-organization, the manager always puts in
the maximum effort e¯. In contrast, the principal has fewer incentives for investing in monitoring
the projects and, as a result, the principal loses not only formal power, but also real power. The
8O-organization can be thought of a firm with P -organization (run by the principal) without an internal
hierarchy. The skilled agent is employed but is not doing anything useful, since the agent’s effort is assumed not
to be contractable.
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equilibrium values of E and e are
E∗A =
B(1− e¯)
2w
, e∗A = e¯.
Hence, the expected utility of the principal under A-organization is
v∗P = w (E
∗
A)
2 + e∗AαB. (4)
2.1.3 The Choice of Decentralized Management
We now explore how the decision whether to delegate formal power to the manager or not
depends on the firm’s real payoff B/w. In particular, the following proposition holds (see Marin
and Verdier (2012) for details).
Proposition 1 Assume that
B˜P =
2(1− k/b)
1− αe¯ < B¯ =
4α
2− e¯ .
It follows that, for B/w < B˜P , the principal chooses P -organization. For B˜P ≤ B/w < B¯, the
principal prefers A-organization. Finally, for B/w ≥ B¯, O-organization (P -organization with
zero effort put in by the manager) yields the highest utility to the principal.
Proof. For convenience, we reproduce the proof of the proposition in the Appendix.
Intuitively, a trade-off between control and initiative arises only at intermediate levels of
profits: the trade-off disappears at low and high levels of profits. At B˜P ≤ B/w < B¯, the
principal delegates formal power to the manager to maintain the initiative. As a result, A-
organization is optimal. At high levels of profits (B/w ≥ B¯), the principal’s stakes are so high
that the principal puts a lot effort into monitoring the projects, which in turn leads to zero
effort put in by the manager under any type of firm organization. As a result, O-organization is
optimal. At low levels of profits (B/w < B˜P ), the principal’s stakes are small and, therefore, the
principal does little monitoring or intervening, and does not depress the initiative of the manager
although keeping control. The manager puts in the maximum effort, and P -organization is
optimal.
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2.2 Product Markets and the Trade Environment
In the previous section, the profits of firms were exogenous. We now endogenize profits by
introducing product market competition and trade into the model. In particular, we consider a
small open economy where the number and the prices of foreign varieties are taken as given.9 In
addition, we assume that there is some exogenous foreign demand for domestic varieties, given
by Am/p(i)
σ (where Am is a parameter).
The domestic demand for the home and foreign varieties of the differentiated good X is
x(i) =
aRP σ−1
(p(i))σ
,
xm(i
′) =
aRP σ−1
(pm(i′))σ
,
where R is the total expenditure in the economy, pm(i
′) is the price of an imported variety i′,
and P is the CES price index given by
P 1−σ =
∫
i∈Ω
p(i)1−σdi+
∫
i′∈Ωm
pm(i
′)1−σdi′.
Here, σ is the elasticity of substitution. Without loss of generality, we assume that pm(i
′) = pm
for any i′. Then,
P 1−σ =
∫
i∈Ω
p(i)1−σdi+ n∗ (pm)1−σ , (5)
where n∗ is the number of foreign varieties in the market (which is exogenous). To simplify the
notation, we denote the level of import penetration, n∗ (pm)1−σ, by IM .
Demand for the homogenous product is
Y =
(1− a)R
pY
,
where pY is the world price of the good. It is assumed that the homogeneous good is produced
with a linear one-to-one technology (requiring only unskilled labour). Hence, the wage rate of
9Modeling a large open economy adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis. Moreover, under certain as-
sumptions, we do not expect that the implications will be qualitatively different from those derived in the present
framework.
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unskilled labour is pinned down by the world price:
w = pY .
We assume that the marginal cost of production of a firm producing variety i is wc(i)/ZX ,
where c(i) stands for the part of the cost that depends on which project is implemented. If the
best project for the principal is implemented, then c(i) = cB, otherwise, c(i) = cb with cb > cB.
The idea here is that when the agent has ‘real power’ in the firm, the agent does not necessarily
pick the cost-minimizing project, but rather that which increases the agent’s perks. This is how
the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent translates to the production side
of the firm. The variable ZX , in turn, describes the ‘productivity’ gains from offshoring some
production tasks. Specifically, ZX is strictly more than one if some part of the production is
offshored, and equal to one if the firm does not offshore (we specify ZX in the next section).
Thus, given the demand for domestic varieties, the price of variety i is
p(i) =
σ
σ − 1
w
ZX
c(i),
This implies that the firm’s total profits (taking into account sales abroad) are
pi(i) = C
(
aRP σ−1 +Am
)( w
ZX
c(i)
)1−σ
,
where C = 1σ
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
.
2.3 Trade in Tasks
To model the offshoring of labour tasks, we adopt the framework of Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). In particular, we assume that production in the differentiated sector involves
a continuum of tasks (of measure one) and performing each task requires c(i) units of labour.
Production of each task can be offshored abroad. The cost of offshoring task j ∈ [0, 1] is γt(j),
where t(j) is increasing and continuously differentiable, implying that it is more costly to offshore
high-indexed tasks.
It is profitable to offshore task j if and only if the cost of producing it domestically is higher
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than the cost of offshoring. That is,
wc(i) > γt(j)w∗c(i),
where w∗ is the cost of unskilled labour abroad. The latter implies that tasks with index
j ∈ [0, IX ] are offshored, while the other tasks are performed domestically. Here IX solves10
w = γt(IX)w
∗. (6)
Given the possibility of offshoring, the marginal cost of a firm producing variety i is
MCi = wc(i) (1− IX) + w∗c(i)
∫ IX
0
γt(j)dj.
Taking into account (6), we have
MCi = wc(i)
(
1− IX +
(∫ IX
0
t(j)dj
)
/t(IX)
)
.
From the definition of ZX ,
MCi =
w
ZX
c(i).
This means that the productivity gains from offshoring represented by ZX are
ZX =
1
1− IX +
(∫ IX
0 t(j)dj
)
/t(IX)
> 1.
As can be seen, ZX is increasing in IX . The more tasks are offshored, the more productive are
the firms. If there is no offshoring (IX = 0), then ZX is equal to one and the marginal cost is
wc(i).
In the same spirit, we consider the offshoring of managerial tasks as a continuum of tasks
(of measure one) performed by a manager which may be offshored abroad. Performing each
10Note that to guarantee the existence of an interior solution of (6), we need to assume that
1
t(1)
< γ
w∗
w
<
1
t(0)
.
This condition states that the cost of offshoring tasks with lower indexes should be sufficiently low, while the cost
of offshoring tasks with higher indexes should be sufficiently high. In this case, only a certain positive fraction of
tasks is offshored.
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task requires one unit of managerial labour. Tasks that are not offshored are performed by
a domestic manager who is paid according to the number of performed tasks. Note that the
domestic manager searches for projects for the firm, as the domestic manager receives a non-
pecuniary benefit from an implemented project. We assume that the ‘foreign’ manager does not
receive any benefits from implemented projects and, therefore, does not have any incentive to
search for projects. That is, the foreign manager only performs some offshored tasks that are
necessary to start a firm.
We assume that the fraction of tasks that can be offshored is exogenously given by IS .
11
Offshoring managerial tasks is profitable only if the cost of foreign managers is less than the cost
of a domestic manager: i.e., q > q∗ (where q and q∗ are the costs of skilled labour at home and
abroad, respectively). We assume that q∗ is sufficiently low that the constraint on the number of
tasks that can be offshored is binding: domestic firms find it profitable to offshore all the tasks
they can offshore. In this case, the cost of entry into the market is given by q(1− IS) + q∗IS .
2.4 The Equilibrium
Recall that the profits of a firm producing variety i are
pi(i) = C
(
aRP σ−1 +Am
)( w
ZX
c(i)
)1−σ
.
When the principal picks the project and has real power in the firm, the marginal cost of
production is cB and the principal’s benefit is
B = C
(
aRP σ−1 +Am
)( w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
(7)
with
α =
(
cb
cB
)1−σ
< 1.
Depending on the parameters in the model, there are three types of equilibria (under P -
organization, A-organization, and O-organization). Each equilibrium is characterized by the
free entry condition and the factor market clearing conditions. The free entry condition means
that the expected principal’s profits are equal to the cost of starting a firm. Remember that
11Endogenizing IS does not substantially change the qualitative results, but makes the analysis more cumber-
some.
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the expected principal’s profits are given by w (E∗k)
2 + e∗kαB where k represents the type of the
organizational equilibrium: k ∈ {P,A,O}. Thus, the free entry condition can be written as
follows:
w (E∗k)
2 + e∗kαB = q(1− IS) + q∗IS . (8)
Let us denote by n the number of firms in the market. Then, under k-organization, E∗kn firms
implement projects that are best for their principals, (1− E∗k) e∗kn firms implement projects that
are best for their managers, and the rest leave the market (as both the principal and the manager
remain uninformed). Hence, taking into account that some tasks are offshored (specifically, only
1− IX tasks are performed domestically), the demand for unskilled labour in the differentiated
sector at k-equilibrium is
LkX = n(1− IX) ∗
 [E∗kcBxB + (1− E∗k)e∗kcbxb] if k = P,O[E∗k(1− e∗k)cBxB + e∗kcbxb] if k = A ,
where xB and xb are the outputs of firms with marginal cost cB and cb, respectively. Then, the
unskilled labour market clearing condition is
LkX + Y
S + n(E∗k)
2 = L, (9)
where Y S is the production of good Y , n(E∗k)
2 is the labour used by principals to monitor
projects, and L is the total endowment of unskilled labour.
Finally, the demand for skilled labour is equal to the number of firms entering the market
multiplied by the number of managerial tasks performed at home. Thus, the market clearing
condition for skilled labour is
H = n(1− IS), (10)
where H is the endowment of skilled labour in the economy. Hence, the number of domestic
firms in the economy is exactly determined by the endowment of skilled labour and the number
of managerial tasks offshored.
Note that if IS is close to unity, the number of firms, n, is close to infinity. This, in turn,
means that firms’ expected profits can be sufficiently low. At the same time, however, firms’
expected profits are pinned down by the cost of managerial labour abroad, q∗, and are therefore
not necessarily as low as required to clear the skilled labour market. As a result, it is possible
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that for sufficiently high values of IS , no equilibrium in the model exists (this happens when the
demand for skilled labour is lower than the supply). To avoid problems with the existence of an
equilibrium, we impose an upper bound on IS . Specifically, we assume that
IS ≤ wL
wL+ q∗H
.
In the Appendix, we show that this condition is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium in the model. Notice that if q∗ tends to zero, the upper bound tends to one.
As the wage rate of unskilled labour w is pinned down by the world price of the homogenous
good and ZX is exactly determined by the relative wage w/w
∗ and the cost of offshoring t(j),
the equilibrium values of q and B can be found from (8) and (7). Finally, the amount produced
in the homogenous sector is determined by (9). Thus, we can find all the endogenous variables
in the model.
To be consistent with the k-organization equilibrium, the equilibrium values of B/w must
belong to the proper interval. Specifically, in order for P -organization to take place, the param-
eters in the model must be such that the solution of the equilibrium system of equations (for
k = P ) results in an equilibrium value of B/w less than B˜P (see Proposition 1). Similarly, in
order for A-organization to take place, the solution of the equilibrium equations (for k = A)
needs to result in a B/w between B˜P and B¯. Finally, for the occurrence of O-organization, the
equilibrium value of B/w implied by the equilibrium equations for k = O needs to be higher
than B¯.
Note that in the present paper we do not explore under which conditions a certain type of
equilibrium takes place in the model. For instance, it can be the case that for some parameters
there are multiple equilibria under P - or A-organization (see Marin and Verdier (2012) for de-
tails). What we do in this paper is to analyse how the offshoring of different types of tasks affects
the equilibrium outcomes, assuming that the economy is either in a P -, A-, or O-equilibrium.
3 Decentralized Management and Offshoring
We now explore how the offshoring of production and managerial tasks affects the type of firm
organization chosen by the principals. In particular, we examine how changes in IX and IS
affect real profits B/w. The idea behind this exercise is the relation between the type of firm
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organization and real profits as stated in Proposition 1. In particular, Proposition 1 suggests
that the level of firm decentralization (the level of formal power delegated to a manager) has a
hump shape as a function of real profits. Thus, understanding the relation between offshoring
and real profits sheds light on the connection between offshoring and firm organization.
Since the results we formulate below hold in any type of equilibrium (see Section 3.3 for
details), without loss of generality, we consider the equilibrium under P -organization. The free
entry condition at P -equilibrium is given by
w (E∗P )
2 + e∗PαB = q(1− IS) + q∗IS .
Taking into account the expressions for E∗P and e
∗
P (see (2)), the free entry condition can be
rewritten:
(1− e¯α)2
4
(
B
w
)2
+ e¯α
B
w
=
q(1− IS) + q∗IS
w
. (11)
Recall from (7) that the principal’s benefit from picking the project is
B = C
(
aRP σ−1 +Am
)( w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
,
where R is the total expenditure of the economy given by wL+ qH. Thus, we have
B
w
= C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ (
aP σ−1
(
L+
q
w
H
)
+
Am
w
)
.
The price index in the economy is given by
P 1−σ =
∫
i∈Ω
p(i)1−σdi+ IM.
As at P -equilibrium, E∗Pn domestic firms implement projects with cost cB and (1− E∗P ) e∗Pn
firms implement projects with cost cb, the price index can be written
P 1−σ = n
(
1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
(E∗P + (1− E∗P ) e∗Pα) + IM,
where ρ = (σ−1)/σ. Moreover, using the expressions for E∗P and e∗P in (2), it is straightforward
to show that
E∗P + (1− E∗P )e∗Pα = e¯α+
(1− e¯α)2
2
B
w
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and the price index is equal to
P 1−σ = n
(
1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ (
e¯α+
(1− e¯α)2
2
B
w
)
+ IM.
Taking into account that the supply of skilled labour is equal to H (implying that n =
H/(1− IS)), the skilled labour market clearing condition can be written as
B/w = C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ a (L+ qwH)
H
1−IS
(
1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ (
e¯α+ (1−e¯α)
2
2
B
w
)
+ IM
+
Am
w
 . (12)
Thus, we have two conditions that determine the equilibrium values of B/w and q/w: the free
entry condition (11) and the skilled labour market clearing condition (12), from which we solve
for B/w and q/w. In the Appendix, we show that a solution of (11) and (12) exists and is
unique. Hence, a P -organizational equilibrium exists if and only if the B/w that solves (11) and
(12) is less than B˜P .
Figure 1 (left quadrant) illustrates the equilibrium. The HH curve depicts the market
clearing condition for skilled labour from (12), which equates the number of firms n requiring a
manager to the supply of skilled managers H/(1−IS). The HH curve is upward sloping because
larger q/w requires larger B/w to satisfy (12). When q/w is large, too many firms are looking
for a manager. In order for (12) to hold, the number of firms n has to decline and thus B/w
increases. The EE curve shows the free entry condition from (11). It equates expected profits
to the fixed costs of market entry. It is upward sloping as well, because as B/w rises, firms
want to enter the market. Firms can enter the market only by hiring a skilled manager. Since
the number of firms is fixed by the resource constraint on skilled managers, q/w rises: entering
firms try to lure away managers from incumbent firms, thus pushing up q/w. For this reason,
the EE curve may be called the ‘war for talent’ curve.
3.0.1 A Change in the Level of Openness
Next, we want to explore how a change in openness IM affects the labour market conditions
for managers as given by (12). We illustrate an increase in the level of openness with the help
of Figure 2. A rise in IM has two effects on the HH curve. First, it shifts the HH curve
downwards as tougher foreign competition reduces firms’ profits for any q/w. Second, with a
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Figure 1: Equilibrium and Offshoring of Production Tasks
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rise in IM , the slope of the HH curve becomes flatter. To illustrate this, we take the derivative
of B/w with respect to q/w. Taking into account (12), this derivative is given by
dB/w
dq/w
=
Cρ1−σaH
H
1−IS
(
e¯α+ (1− e¯α)2 Bw − (1−e¯α)
2
2
Am
w C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ)
+ IM
(
1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)σ−1 .
As can be seen, a rise in IM decreases the value of the derivative for any B/w and q/w. In an
economy with more foreign firms, there are relatively fewer domestic firms active in the market
as there is less of an incentive for domestic firms to enter (the downward shift of the HH curve).
An increase in q/w requires the number of firms to decline (in order for the labour market
condition for managers (12) to hold), which increases B/w by less when the economy is more
open to trade, as only domestic firms’ profits increase. Consequently, the HH curve flattens
when the economy becomes more open. Figure 2 shows that an increase in the level of openness
reduces the relative wage for managers as there are more foreign firms in the market who do not
require a domestic manager. Foreign firms employ foreign managers when they deliver goods to
the domestic market. Therefore, an increase in openness eases the demand for local managers.
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Figure 2: An Increase in the Level of Openness
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3.1 Offshoring of Production Tasks
We now explore how changes in the scale of offshoring of production tasks, IX , affect the
equilibrium value of B/w. Recall that
ZX =
1
1− IX +
(∫ IX
0 t(j)dj
)
/t(IX)
,
where IX is determined from w = γt(IX)w
∗. As w is pinned down by the world price of the
homogenous good, the only effect of IX on B/w is through changes in ZX . In particular, a
larger IX results in higher productivity gains ZX . Thus, we need to explore how a rise in ZX
affects real profits. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 In P -organizational equilibrium, a rise in ZX leads to a higher value of real
profits B/w and to a rise in q/w in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows directly from (11) and (12).
We illustrate the intuition with the help of Figure 1. A rise in ZX shifts the HH curve
upwards, while the free entry curve EE does not change (left quadrant). As a result, the
equilibrium values of B/w and q/w rise. There are two opposing effects of a rise in ZX on
real profits: it lowers marginal costs wc(i)/ZX and increases firms’ real profits for any q/w (the
productivity effect); at the same time, all other domestic firms become more productive as well,
lowering firms’ revenues and profits through a decrease in RP σ−1 (the revenue effect). Note
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that the number of firms entering the market does not change as it is given by the resource
constraint on managers n = H/(1 − IS). As can be seen from Proposition 2 and Figure 1, the
positive productivity effect dominates the negative revenue effect and, as a result, real profits
B/w unambiguously rise with the offshoring of production tasks ZX (right quadrant). This is
because we consider an open economy. When the domestic market is open to foreign competition
(as captured by IM), a rise in ZX affects only the productivity of domestic firms but leaves
those of their foreign rivals unchanged. The improved competitiveness of domestic firms weakens
the negative revenue effect. Moreover, the presence of export markets (given by Am) enhances
the effect of lower marginal costs on profits.12
In a closed economy (when Am = 0 and IM = 0), the system of equations (11) and (12)
changes to 
q(1−IS)+q∗IS
w =
(1−e¯α)2
4
(
B
w
)2
+ e¯αBw ,
B/w =
Caρ1−σ( LH+
q
w )(1−IS)
e¯α+
(1−e¯α)2
2
B
w
.
(13)
and the two opposing effects on real profits exactly cancel out. Thus, in a closed economy, a
rise in B/w (due to lower marginal costs) is exactly compensated by the decline in B/w (due to
the smaller revenue when all other domestic firms serving the market become more productive
as well) and the offshoring of production tasks does not change real profits and the way firms
organize.
When the increase in ZX is sufficiently large, B/w rises and exceeds the cutoff B˜P (see
Proposition 1). As a result, firms switch from P -organization to A-organization and decentralize
formal power to the skilled manager to foster that manager’s initiative.
3.2 Offshoring of Managerial Tasks
In this section, we consider the offshoring of managerial tasks. In particular, we examine how
the offshoring of managerial labour affects firm’s real profits, their level of decentralization, and
the relative wages for managers. As in the previous section, we analyse the P -equilibrium in the
12Actually, in the small open economy (SOE) we consider here, the foreign market share IM is exogenous and
does not change when domestic firms become more competitive due to an offshoring of production tasks. As a
result, the foreign market share IM prevents revenues RPσ−1 from falling proportionally to the rise in ZX (as
prices for foreign varieties do not fall when domestic firms become more productive). In a fully developed general
equilibrium North–South model of offshoring, IM falls in response to a rise in ZX , as domestic firms take some
of the domestic market from foreign rivals. For the gain in market shares due to offshoring, see Marin, Schymik,
and Tscheke (2014).
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model. Recall that offshoring managerial tasks takes place only if the cost of a foreign manager
is lower than the cost of a domestic manager, i.e., q > q∗. In the model, q is endogenously
determined and affected by offshoring. To guarantee q > q∗ for any value of IS , we assume that
q∗ satisfies
C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ Am
w
> 2
√
(e¯α)2 + q
∗
w (1− e¯α)2 − e¯α
(1− e¯α)2 . (14)
Note that the latter inequality holds when q∗ is sufficiently small. In this case, the equilibrium
value of q is strictly greater than q∗ for any size of the domestic market (for details, see the
Appendix).
Proposition 3 examines how changes in the number of managerial tasks offshored affect real
profits and the relative wages for managers.
Proposition 3 At P -equilibrium, there exists a cutoff level of openness of the economy, denoted
by IMP , such that for IM > IMP : B/w and q/w are increasing in IS; and for IM ≤ IMP :
B/w is declining in IS, while the impact of IS on q/w is ambiguous.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 3 with the help of Figures 3 and 4. The left
quadrant of Figures 3 and 4 gives the free entry curve EE and the market clearing curve HH,
while the right quadrant shows the real profits B/w as a function of the offshoring of managerial
tasks IS . The offshoring of managerial tasks has three distinct effects on the equilibrium outcome.
First, a rise in IS lowers the cost of market entry and shifts down the free entry curve EE,
increasing B/w and q/w (the war for talent effect: a move from e0 to eT ). The lower costs of
entry make it attractive for firms to enter the market. However, firms can enter only if they
hire a manager. As the number of firms is fixed by the resource constraint for managers, firms
compete with the incumbent firms for the available pool of managers in the economy, pushing
up the relative costs of managerial labour q/w and the level of profits firms require to enter the
market B/w.
Second, a rise in IS lowers the demand for skilled managers in the North and shifts the HH
curve down, decreasing the skill premium for managers q/w and real profits B/w (the labour
market effect: a move from eT to eL). This relaxes the resource constraint on skilled managers
in the North, allowing more domestic firms to find a manager. As the number of domestic firms
rises, competition in the domestic market intensifies and firms’ real profits B/w decrease (the
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competition effect).
The overall effect on B/w and q/w depends on the relative sizes of these effects (the war
for talent effect, the labour market effect, and the competition effect). This depends on the
exposure to international trade IM . When openness to trade is sufficiently high (IM > IMP ),
the positive war for talent effect prevails over the negative competition effect and, as a result, real
profits unambiguously rise with an increase in IS (see Figure 3). To understand why, recall from
the previous section that the derivative dB/wdq/w becomes smaller with larger IM. When the trade
exposure is large, the number of foreign firms is large in the domestic economy and, thus, fewer
domestic firms have an incentive to enter, reducing real profits only a little. As a result, a rise
in IS shifts the HH curve down only a little. Otherwise, when the level of import competition
is sufficiently small (IM ≤ IMP ), the competition effect dominates the war for talent effect
and profits decline in response to a rise in IS . As a result, an increase in IS results in a large
downward shift of the HH curve (see Figure 4).
The impact of a rise in IS on q/w remains ambiguous, as the war for talent effect pushing
up q/w and the labour demand effect lowering q/w cannot be ranked in magnitude. For
IM > IMP , a rise in IS leads to an unambiguous rise in q/w as the war for talent effect prevails
over the labour market effect. In an economy with many foreign firms, fewer domestic firms
demand a manager, as fewer firms find it profitable to enter the market (see Figure 2 for an
increase in openness IM). As the number of entrants is smaller in an open economy, changes in
their demand for managers affect the relative wage for managers only a little. As a result, the
labour market effect is small for IM > IMP (see Figure 3).
For IM < IMP , the direction of the change in q/w cannot be signed. On the one hand, a
lower IM makes the downward shift of the HH curve larger, with a stronger negative impact on
q/w via the labour demand effect. On the other hand, a lower IM makes the slope of the HH
curve steeper (for IM < IMP , changes in the demand for managers have a large effect on the
relative wages of managers), which in turn makes the positive effect on q/w stronger through
the war for talent effect (as a rise in the number of entrants pushes up the relative cost of skilled
managers). Hence, for sufficiently low IM , we cannot determine the overall impact on q/w.
Proposition 3 suggests that the impact of the offshoring of managerial labour on firm orga-
nization depends on the level of openness to foreign competition. If the economy is sufficiently
open, an offshoring of managerial labour results in firm decentralization (the P -equilibrium be-
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Figure 3: Offshoring of Managerial Tasks: IM>IMP
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Figure 4: Offshoring of Managerial Tasks: IM<IMP
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comes ‘closer’ to the A-equilibrium). Otherwise, an offshoring of managerial labour leads firms
to recentralize power with their top management.
3.3 Offshoring under A- or O-organization
In this section, we argue that Propositions 2 and 3 hold for A- and O-equilibria as well. Re-
member that the O-equilibrium is a special case of the P -equilibrium with e¯ being equal to zero.
In particular, the O-equilibrium is described by
q(1−IS)+q∗IS
w =
1
4
(
B
w
)2
,
B/w = C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ ( a(L+ qwH)(1−IS)
H
(
1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
( 12
B
w )+(1−IS)IM
+ Amw
)
.
(15)
An O-equilibrium exists if the value of B/w determined by the above system of equations is
greater than B¯. As the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 hold for any non-negative value of e¯
including the zero value, they obviously hold in case of an O-equilibrium as well. The only
difference from a P -equilibrium is the threshold value of the level of foreign competition in
Proposition 3, IMP . In O-equilibrium, it is different (as e¯ = 0). We denote it by IMO.
The equations for an A-equilibrium are
q(1−IS)+q∗IS
w =
(1−e¯)2
4
(
B
w
)2
+ e¯Bw ,
B/w = C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ ( a(L+ qwH)(1−IS)
H
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1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ(
e¯+
(1−e¯)2
2
B
w
)
+(1−IS)IM
+ Amw
)
.
(16)
As can be seen, the equilibrium equations describing an A-equilibrium correspond to the equa-
tions describing an P -equilibrium with α being equal to one. Since the proofs of Propositions 2
and 3 hold for any positive value of α including one, the propositions hold for an A-equilibrium
as well. Again, at an A-equilibrium, the threshold value of the level of foreign competition in
Proposition 3 is different from those at P - and O- equilibria. We denote this value by IMA.
Notice that to guarantee that the cost of foreign skilled labour is lower than the cost of
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domestic skilled labour in an equilibrium of any type (see (14)), we need to assume that
C
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w
 .
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test the predictions of the model using a unique survey of firm level data of
Austrian and German multinational firms with subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. We start with a
description of the data.
4.1 The Data
We conducted a survey of 660 multinational corporations in Austria and Germany with 2200
affiliate firms in Eastern Europe, Russia, the Ukraine, and other former Soviet Republics. The
sample is an unbalanced panel of 1200 German and 1000 Austrian foreign direct investments
and it covers 80% of total German investment and 100% of total Austrian investment to Eastern
Europe in 1990–2001 (the actual numbers are from the 1997–2000 in Germany and 1999–2000
in Austria). In 1998–1999, about 90% of the total outgoing foreign direct investment of Austria
was reoriented to Eastern Europe, while in Germany, Eastern Europe accounted for only about
4%–5% of total outgoing foreign direct investment. This explains why the sample consists of
relatively more Austrian multinational investments in spite of Austria’s being much smaller
than Germany (with 8 million people, Austria’s population is 10% of Germany’s). Since foreign
direct investment activity in Eastern Europe began with the fall of communism in 1990, having
been prohibited during the period of central planning, we were able to obtain a representative
sample of foreign direct investment in spite of collecting detailed information on the internal
organization of these firms.
4.1.1 Decentralized Management
As a measure of the level of decentralization of authority in an offshoring firm, we employ
the allocation of decision authority within the parental multinational firm. This measure is
obtained from the question: ‘Who decides the following issues concerning your corporation, top
CEO/owner or the divisional manager, please rank between 1 (centralized decision taken at
26
the top CEO/owner level) and 5 (decentralized decision taken at the divisional level)?’ The
survey lists 13 corporate decisions for Austrian parent firms and 16 corporate decisions for
German parent firms. The categories of corporate decisions include decisions over acquisitions,
finance, the budget, new strategies, transfer pricing, new products, R&D expenditures, firing
and hiring of personnel, changes of suppliers, product pricing, and wage increases. We then
calculate a simple average of the available scores of these corporate decisions. The average level
of decentralization in the sample is 2.83. In addition, we normalize the index to a z-score with
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in order to facilitate the interpretation of the
estimated effects. Values of the normalized index indicate the difference from the mean of the
original decentralization index (2.83) in numbers of standard deviations (0.87).
4.1.2 Offshoring of Production Tasks
To proxy the level of offshoring of production tasks, we use information in the survey on intrafirm
trade flows between affiliate firms and the parent firm. The idea here is that the multinational
firm is an offshoring firm if it imports some intermediate inputs from its affiliates in Eastern
Europe. In particular, as a proxy for the number of production tasks offshored by a firm, we
consider the variable intrafirm imports in percent of parent firm’s sales, which is defined as the
sum over all intrafirm imports of intermediate inputs of one particular multinational firm from
all its affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to the domestic sales of this multinational firm. As
an alternative, we use the dummy variable intrafirm imports to capture whether or not the
multinational firm is offshoring production labour at all.
As an instrument for the offshoring of production tasks, we use the dummy variable standard-
ized input, which indicates whether the affiliate firm delivers an input good that is standardized
in both quality and design. Table 4 of the Data Appendix shows that in 61% of the investments
to Eastern Europe, affiliate firms supplied a standardized input to the parent firm. We discuss
the instrumental variable in greater detail when we describe the empirical results in the next
section.
4.1.3 Offshoring of Managerial Tasks
To proxy the level of offshoring of managerial tasks, we use information derived from the survey
question: ‘How many managers of your parent company have been sent to the affiliate firm?’
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Specifically, we assume that if the affiliate firm hires the manager from the local host country
market (that is, the manager is not sent by the parent company), then the manager is considered
to be offshored to the affiliate firm. Based on this logic we construct the following proxy for the
offshoring of managerial tasks. We sum over all managers in the multinational firm’s affiliates in
Eastern Europe that have not been sent by the parent company, and express this as a fraction
of the sum of these affiliates’ employment. We also express this sum of offshored managers as a
fraction of parental employment with an academic degree. As an alternative proxy, we use the
dummy variable offshored manager dummy, which captures whether or not the multinational
firm is offshoring one or more managers to its subsidiary in Eastern Europe. This dummy is
equal to one if the multinational firm does not send managers to its affiliate, and to zero if it
sends one or more managers.
As can be seen from Table 4 in the Data Appendix, in 57% of the investment to Eastern
Europe, multinational firms from Austria or Germany have not sent managers to the affiliate
firm in Eastern Europe. On average, the multinational firms have offshored 2.63 managers per
investment project with a maximum of 39 managers.
4.1.4 Competition and Trade Openness
We use several proxies for the level of competition and trade openness. The variables domestic
competition and foreign competition are dummy variables that are subjective firm level measures
of domestic and foreign competition as perceived by the firm. They are constructed using infor-
mation from the survey question: ‘How many competitors do you face in your local (Austrian
or German) market and worldwide, respectively?’ The dummy variables take the value 1 if the
parent firm faces many or very many competitors for their product in their local markets or
worldwide, rather than no or few competitors. These dummies represent the firm level measures
of domestic competition and openness.
We calculate sectoral measures of domestic competition and openness by taking the sample
means of the firm level measures of domestic, respectively foreign competition at the ISIC 3 digit
level. These measures stand for the level of domestic competition or openness of the industry to
which the firm belongs. We then use this measure of the industry openness to construct a dummy
variable highly open and less open, respectively. The variable highly open is a dummy for when
the sector’s openness is above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution, and less open
28
indicates when the sector’s openness is below the 40th percentile or below the 10th percentile
of the same distribution. In addition, as a sectoral measure of domestic competition, we use
the change in the number of establishments between 1997 and 1998 in Germany and Austria
at the 4 digit ISIC level taken from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
INDSTAT database.
4.1.5 Human Resources
Our survey also includes information on the human resource policies of the multinational firms
in the sample. Information on the compensation of executives in our multinational firms is
based on two sources. First, we obtained executive payment data from Kienbaum Managemen-
t Consulting. Kienbaum is a management consultancy specializing in remuneration policies,
which collects annual information on the executive compensation at large German firms. The
Kienbaum data allow us to calculate the average compensation per executive, since the data
contain information on the total compensation of the executive board and the number of exec-
utive board members. Since Kienbaum provides information only for the largest German firms,
we additionally hand-collected this information from the annual reports of the remaining firms
whenever available. Likewise, we divided the aggregate earnings of executives by the number
of executives working for the firm to obtain the average compensation of board members. All
average executive payments are expressed relative to the average wage of the firm in logarithms.
The latter information comes from our firm survey.
4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 Offshoring of Production Tasks and Decentralized Management
We start by examining the relation between the offshoring of production tasks to Eastern Europe
and the level of decision making in the parental firms of multinational corporations located in
Austria and Germany. According to Proposition 2 and Figure 1, an increase in the offshoring
of production tasks leads to an increase in profits. According to Proposition 1, the increase in
profits ultimately induces firms to switch from a centralized P -organization to a decentralized
A-organization. From this, we derive
Prediction 1: In a cross-section of firms in an economy open to trade, multinational firms
will have more decentralized management when they are offshoring more production tasks to low
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wage countries.
In order to test Prediction 1, we consider the following econometric model for decentralized
management:
deci = ∂0 + ∂1offshi + ∂2Xi + εi, (17)
where deci denotes the level of decentralization in the parental firm, offshi is a proxy for the
level of offshoring of production tasks (see Section 4.1.2), Xi is a set of controls, and εi is the
error term. According to Prediction 1, we expect ∂1 > 0. We also, when possible, include a set
of industry dummies and home and host country fixed effects. Note that the unit of observation
in all regressions is the investment project, comprising a parent firm together with one of its
affiliate firms. Therefore, multinational firms with more affiliates get a larger weight in the
regression and have a stronger influence on the parameter estimates. Thus, standard errors are
likely to be correlated between foreign direct investments of identical parental firms. To take
this into account, we use cluster-robust standard errors with clustering at the parental firm level
when we calculate the significance of the estimated parameters.
Our main findings are given in columns 1–4 of Table 1, which presents ordinary least squares
estimates of Equation (17). In columns 1–3, we use intrafirm imports in percent of parental
sales as the proxy for the number of production tasks offshored. As predicted by the theory, the
estimated coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level. The estimated coefficient of
0.003 in the second column means that an increase in the share of intrafirm imports in parental
sales by 8.4% (which is the mean of the sample) increases the level of decentralized management
by 0.63%.13
In column 3, we rerun the regression of column 1 with a firm level measure of foreign
competition with similar results. In column 4, we replace the measure of offshoring by the
dummy variable intrafirm imports to see if it makes a difference whether the firm offshores at
all or how many tasks it offshores. The results are, however, similar. In column 5, we replace
the dependent variable with a normalized decentralization index with mean 0 and standard
deviation of one to facilitate the economic interpretation. An increase in the share of intrafirm
imports in parental sales by one percentage point increases the level of decentralization by 0.003.
13We obtain this number by multiplying 0.003 by the mean of intrafirm imports in parental sales of 8.4 (0.003
* 8.4 = 0.0252). 0.0252 corresponds to an increase in the decentralization index of 0.63%.
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In other words, this means that an increase in the share of intrafirm imports by one standard
deviation (34.72) raises the level of decentralization by about 0.1 standard deviations (34.72 ×
0.003 = 0.106).
In columns 6–8, we deal with potential endogeneity. A reversed causality problem might be
present in our regressions if firms that are more decentralized choose to offshore more. In order
to address this potential endogeneity problem, we re-estimate Equation (17) by two stage least
squares and instrument for offshoring. As an instrument we use the dummy variable standardized
input. The idea here is that when the affiliate firm delivers a standardized input to the parent
firm, the offshoring of production tasks will be rather organized inside the firm in the form of
a foreign direct investment than at arm’s length to an independent foreign input supplier. It
is more important to give the parental firm stronger incentives to provide headquarter services
rather than to the foreign input supplier.14 Thus, we expect more intra-firm imports when
the imported input is standardized. The first stage regressions confirm that the instrument is
relevant.15 The Cragg–Donald F -statistics for weak identification exceed the critical value of
16.38 for 10% IV bias. Interestingly, in our IV estimates, offshoring is only significant for the
intrafirm imports dummy and stops being significant for the intensity measure of offshoring. This
makes sense, since the organization of offshoring appears to depend on what the firm offshores (a
standardized input with little hold-up problems) rather than how many tasks are offshored. In
column 7, the estimated coefficient of 1.337 suggests that offshoring firms are 33.4% (1.337/4 =
0.334) more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. In terms of the normalized decentralization
index in column 8, this means that offshoring firms are more decentralized by 1.54 standard
deviations.
Table 1 about here
4.2.2 Offshoring of Managerial Tasks and Decentralized Management
Next, we study the relation between the offshoring of managerial tasks and the level of decentral-
ized management in the parental firms of multinational corporations. According to Proposition
3 and Figures 3 and 4, an increase in the offshoring of managerial tasks leads to an increase
14For this reasoning, see Antras and Helpman (2008).
15The first stage regressions show that the instrument is relevant, but the sign of the estimated coefficient does
not support the prediction of Antras and Helpman (2008), since intra-firm imports are lower when the foreign
input is standardized.
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in profits when the effect of the lower costs of market entry on profits (the ‘war for talent’
effect) outweighs the effect of the increase in the number of firms on profits (the competition
effect, which lowers profits). This is the case when the economy is sufficiently open to foreign
competition. This increase in profits, in turn, induces firms to switch from P -organization to
A-organization, as stated in Proposition 1. From this, we derive
Prediction 2: In a cross section of firms in sectors sufficiently open to trade, multinational
firms will have more decentralized management when they offshore more managerial tasks to low
wage countries.
We specify the following model for decentralized management to test for Prediction 2
deci = ∂0 + ∂1offmi + ∂2offmi × openl + ∂3openl + ∂4Xi + εi, (18)
where offmi is a proxy for the level of offshoring of managerial tasks (see Section 4.1.3), openl
is the dummy variable highly open used as a proxy for the openness of the sector to which the
firm belongs (recall that this dummy is equal to one if the sector’s openness is above the 25th
percentile), Xi is a set of controls, and εi is an error term. The explanatory variable offmi
captures the lower demand for managers as a result of managerial offshoring (the labour market
effect), lowering the level of profits that firms require to enter the market. These lower profits, in
turn, induce firms to switch back to P -organization, resulting in more centralized management.
Thus, we expect ∂1 < 0. The interaction term offmi × openl is supposed to account for the
prediction of the theory that profits and the level of decentralization will increase in response to
managerial offshoring only when firms are sufficiently exposed to foreign competition. Hence,
we expect ∂2 > 0.
Table 2 presents the ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (18). Note that the sample
size has dropped substantially from that of Table 1, as we have fewer observations of managerial
offshoring than of production offshoring. In column 1, we employ the dummy variable offshored
manager as a proxy for the offshoring of managerial tasks. The coefficient on the offshored
manager dummy is negative, but not significant. In column 2, we add the interaction term
highly open × offshored manager dummy as a measure of offmi × openl. Now the coefficient
on offmi is negative and significant at the 5% level. Moreover, as predicted by the theory, the
interaction term offmi × openl is positive and significant at the 10% level.
In columns 3–6, we consider alternative proxies for the offshoring of managerial tasks, as
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we expect the number of offshored tasks to matter for the results. In columns 3 and 4, we
replace the offshored manager dummy by the variable Σ # offshored managers / Σ affiliate
employment, which is now significant as well as the corresponding interaction term offmi∗openl.
Alternatively, in columns 5 and 6 we use Σ # offshored managers / parent skilled employment
as a proxy for the number of offshored managerial tasks. Managerial offshoring as well as the
interaction term have the expected signs and are both highly significant, at the 1% level.
Also note that the explanatory power (measured byR2) substantially rises from 0.181 to 0.265
with the inclusion of the interaction term. As predicted by the theory, the interplay of offshoring
managerial tasks with sectoral openness plays an important role in explaining the variation in the
level of decentralization across multinational firms. From column 6, an increase of the fraction of
managers offshored by the sample mean of 1.48 (expressed in terms of the number of academics
employed by the parent firm) reduces the level of decentralization by 3.1% ((-0.084×1.48)/4 =
-0.031), but increases the level of decentralization by 4.0% ((-0.084+0.193)×1.48/4 = 0.040) if
foreign competition is above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution.
In column 7, we use the normalized index of the level of decentralization as the dependent
variable and rerun specification (6) to interpret the results. Column 7 shows that an increase of
the fraction of managers offshored by the sample mean of 1.48 reduces the level of decentraliza-
tion by 0.148 standard deviations, but increases the level of decentralization by 0.192 standard
deviations if foreign competition is above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution.
Table 2 about here
4.2.3 Offshoring of Managerial Tasks and CEO Wages
Finally, we examine the relation between the offshoring of managerial tasks and the relative wages
of managers. According to Proposition 3 and Figures 3 and 4, an increase in the offshoring of
managerial tasks reduces the demand for managers, lowering CEO wages (the labour market
effect), and leads to firm entry, pushing up CEO wages (the ‘war for talent’ effect). The relative
sizes of these effects depends on the openness of the economy. When the economy is sufficiently
closed to international trade, the ‘war for talent’ effect as well as the labour market effect are
large. From this, we have
Prediction 3: In a cross section of firms, multinational firms will pay their CEOs lower
wages when they are offshoring managerial tasks to low wage countries and they will pay their
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CEOs higher wages when the number of firms in the domestic market increases. Both effects are
magnified in less open sectors.
We specify the following model for CEO wages to test for Prediction 3.
wagei = ∂0 + ∂1offmi + ∂2∆firms+ ∂3offmi × opens+ ∂4opens+ ∂5Xi + εi, (19)
where wagei is the natural logarithm of the average executive wage in the parental firm i relative
to its average firm wage. The variable ∆firms is the change in the number of firms in the sector,
opens is a dummy for when the openness of the sector is below the 40th percentile of the openness
distribution (or below the 10th percentile), Xi is a set of controls, and εi is an error term. Here,
offmi captures the reduced demand for managers as a result of managerial offshoring’s lowering
relative CEO wages (the labour market effect). Thus, we expect ∂1 < 0. The variable ∆firms
measures the increase in the number of firms in the sector of the firm, resulting in a larger
demand for managers pushing up CEO wages (the ‘war for talent’ effect). Thus, we expect
∂2 > 0. The interaction term offmi × opens is supposed to take into account the prediction
that the negative effect of a lower demand for managers on relative CEO wages is magnified in
less open sectors. Hence, we expect ∂3 < 0.
Table 3 presents the ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (19) to test for the labour
market effect and the ‘war for talent’ effect of managerial offshoring. Note that our sample size
is substantially smaller in the regressions of Equation (19). This is due to the lack of data on
executive remuneration in the limited liability corporations in our sample. These firms are not
subject to the same disclosure requirements of preparing annual reports with information on
executive remunerations. Nevertheless, we consider our estimates to be informative since our
data are the first that allow assessing the effect of offshoring managerial tasks on executive wages
in stock companies.
In column 1, we include the offshored manager dummy and the variable ∆firms. The
offshored manager dummy is not significant, suggesting that the status of a firm as an offshorer
itself does not affect the relative wage it pays its CEOs. As can be seen in column 2, the
number of managers offshored is what matters for the labour market outcome of executive pay.
In column 2 we replace the dummy variable by the number of managers offshored (# offshored
managers). As predicted by the theory, the higher is the number of managerial tasks offshored
by the parental firm, the lower is the relative wage of its CEOs (controlling for the ‘war for talent’
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effect). More specifically, an additional manager offshored lowers the relative CEO compensation
by 6.9%. To give this finding more economic meaning, we multiply the estimated coefficients of
offmi in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 by the average number of managers offshored per subsidiary
of 2.63, implying that relative CEO wages were lower by between 13.1 (-0.0499×2.63)% and 18
(-0.069×2.63)% due to managerial offshoring. Note that by replacing the dummy variable with
#offshored managers, the explanatory power of the regression increases from 0.457 to 0.626.
We include the change in the number of establishments ’97–’98 in columns 1 and 2 to test
whether an increase in the competition for managers pushes up CEO wages. This is indeed the
case. An increase by one competitor increases relative CEO compensation of parental firms by
2%. The effect is highly significant at the 1% level. To quantify the total effect of an additional
offshored manager on relative CEO wages, we subtract from the estimated labour market effect
of -6.9% the estimated ‘war for talent’ effect of 2.0 and, as a result, obtain -4.9% (see column 2
of the table).16 Notice that in all regressions we include intra-firm imports / parental sales to
control for offshoring of production tasks. As expected from the theory (see Proposition 2), a
rise in the share of intra-firm imports has a positive impact on relative CEO wages. Specifically,
an increase in the share of intra-firm imports by 1 percentage point leads to an increase in CEO
wages relative to workers of 1.2%.
In columns 3 to 5 we examine the effect of openness. We expect the labour market and the
‘war for talent’ effect to be larger when the economy is not too open to foreign competition. Due
to the limitations of the data, we can test for the role of openness in determining the labour
market effect only. From Figure 2, we expect that a decline in openness (lower IM) increases
relative CEO wages. In column 3, we include the dummy less open <40th percentile, which
appears to be not significant. In column 4, we add the interaction term less open <40th pctl.
× # offshored managers, which appears to be not significant as well. In column 5, we lower
the degree of openness by using the dummy less open <10th percentile to examine whether the
labour market effect becomes stronger for less open firms. As can be seen from the table, this
is not the case. Although both being less open itself as well as the interaction term less open
<10 × # offshored managers are now highly significant at conventional levels, the sign of the
16This calculation assumes that one additional offshored manager allows one additional competitor to enter
the market. This assumption is motivated by our model, in which the equilibrium condition for the managerial
labour market is given by n(1 − Is) = H. The latter can be rewritten as n − n ∗ Is = H. If we interpret n ∗ Is
as the number of managers offshored, then one additional manager offshored means that n ∗ Is goes up by one.
This, in turn, implies that in order for the equilibrium condition to hold, n must go up by one unit as well.
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coefficients is not as expected.
The sign of less open <10th percentile is negative, suggesting that foreign firms put additional
pressure on the domestic labour market for managers. This can be explained by the fact that
foreign firms may need domestic managers to operate in the market. As a result, there being
fewer foreign firms eases the foreign demand for domestic managers and, thereby, lowers relative
CEO wages. In our model, however, being less open means that fewer foreign firms sell output on
the domestic market, which is produced with the use of foreign managers only, thereby putting
less pressure on the domestic labour market for managers.17 Note that the R2 substantially rises
from 0.200 to 0.248 with the less open measure (see columns 5 and 6).
Table 3 about here
5 Conclusion
In this paper we incorporate a stylized model of trade in tasks into a small open economy
version of the theory of firm organization of Marin and Verdier (2012). We test the predictions
of the model with data of 660 offshoring firms in Austria and Germany. We find that offshoring
of production and managerial tasks leads to more decentralized management. For managerial
tasks this holds, however, only for sufficiently open economies. We find further that managerial
offshoring leads to lower CEO wages relative to workers. We obtain large effects on relative CEO
wages from managerial offshoring, which suggests that CEOs operate in a tight labour market
giving them large rents.
17The empirical findings here are consistent with Marin and Verdier (2012), who suggest that international
trade (rather than trade in tasks) triggers a competition for managers, which in turn pushes up CEO wages.
Empirically, this is supported by Cunat and Guadalupe (2009).
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Appendix
The Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1. Consider first the case when B/w < B˜P = 2(1 − k/b)/(1 − αe¯). As B/w < B˜P , the
manager puts in the maximum effort, e¯, under both types of the firm organization. Hence, the
principal’s utility in case of P -organization is
u∗P = w (E
∗
P )
2 + e∗PαB
= w
(
B(1− αe¯)
2w
)2
+ e¯αB.
Under A-organization, the utility is
v∗P = w (E
∗
A)
2 + e∗AαB
= w
(
B(1− e¯)
2w
)2
+ e¯αB.
It is straightforward to see that u∗P > v
∗
P (as α < 1). As a result, P -organization is optimal.
Case 2. Consider now the case when B˜P ≤ B/w < B¯. In this case, the manager puts in
zero effort under P -organization and the maximum effort under A-organization. As a result,
u∗P = w
(
B
2w
)2
,
v∗P = w
(
B(1− e¯)
2w
)2
+ e¯αB.
It can be shown that
v∗P > u
∗
P ⇐⇒ B/w < B¯,
implying that A-organization is optimal if B˜P ≤ B/w < B¯.
Case 3. Finally, from the previous reasoning, it follows that when B/w ≥ B¯, P -organization
is optimal: u∗P > v
∗
P and the manager puts in zero effort. That is, we have O-organization as
the equilibrium outcome.
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Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
In this subsection of the Appendix, we show that there exists a unique solution of (11) and (12)
in B/w and q/w. It is straightforward to see from (11) and (12) that B/w solves the following
equation (we substitute the free entry condition into the skilled labor market clearing condition):
B/w = C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σa
(
L(1− IS) +
(
(1−e¯α)2
4
(
B
w
)2
+ e¯αBw − q
∗IS
w
)
H
)
H
(
1
ρ
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ (
e¯α+ (1−e¯α)
2
2
B
w
)
+ IM(1− IS)
+
Am
w
 . (20)
Let us define F (B/w) as the right-hand side of (20). Then, B/w solves
B/w = F (B/w).
It can be shown that F (B/w) behaves as a linear function (of B/w) when B/w tends to infinity.
The slope of this function is equal to Caρ1−σ/2. Recall that C = 1σ
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
and ρ = σ−1σ .
Then the slope of F (B/w) in a neighbourhood of infinity is a/2σ, which is strictly less than one
(as a < 1 and σ > 1). Thus, for high values of B/w, we have F (B/w) < B/w. Moreover, it
is straightforward to show that if IS ≤ wL/(wL + q∗H), then F (0) > 0. This implies that for
low values of B/w, one has F (B/w) > B/w. This in turn immediately implies that there is a
solution of (20).
Note that Equation (20) can be transformed into a quadratic equation of B/w and, therefore,
cannot have more than two solutions. Taking into account the properties of the function F (B/w),
one can see that Equation (20) cannot have exactly two solutions as well. As a result, (20) has
a unique solution. This in turn implies that (11) and (12) has a unique solution.
When Offshoring is Profitable
Note that q > q∗ if and only if
q(1− IS) + q∗IS
w
>
q∗
w
.
The left-hand side of the inequality is the real cost of entry into the market if IS tasks are
offshored. That is, in P -equilibrium,
q(1− IS) + q∗IS
w
=
(1− e¯α)2
4
(
B
w
)2
+ e¯α
B
w
.
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Thus, q > q∗ if and only if
(1− e¯α)2
4
(
B
w
)2
+ e¯α
B
w
>
q∗
w
⇐⇒
B
w
> 2
√
(e¯α)2 + q
∗
w (1− e¯α)2 − e¯α
(1− e¯α)2 .
As can be inferred from the equilibrium condition for B/w (see (??)), B/w is always strictly
greater than C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
Am
w . Hence,
C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ Am
w
> 2
√
(e¯α)2 + q
∗
w (1− e¯α)2 − e¯α
(1− e¯α)2 =⇒
B
w
> 2
√
(e¯α)2 + q
∗
w (1− e¯α)2 − e¯α
(1− e¯α)2 =⇒
q > q∗.
The Proof of Proposition 3
The proof below establishes our predictions regarding the effect of managerial offshoring on firm
organization as stated in Proposition 3. Specifically, we consider how the equilibrium real profits
in Equation (20) are affected by the fraction of offshored managerial tasks. First, we analyse the
derivative of the equilibrium real profits from (20) with respect to the measure of managerial
offshoring IS . Then, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for this derivative to be
positive (in this case, a rise in the number of offshored managerial tasks under P -organization
leads to an increase in the real profits and thereby prompts a transition to a decentralized
A-organization).
Let us denote the right-hand side of (20) by F (B/w, IS). Then, the equilibrium value of
B/w solves
B/w = F (B/w, IS),
where
F (B/w, IS) ≡ C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σa
(
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(
(1−e¯α)2
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It can be shown that
F ′IS (B/w, IS) = C
(
w
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cB
)1−σ
aH
G(B/w)(
H
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ZXρ
)1−σ [
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2
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)2 ,
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.
Note that G(B/w) is a quadratic function of B/w. As G(B/w) is U shaped and G(0) is
negative, the equation G(B/w) = 0 has two solutions: one positive and one negative. Let us
write (B/w)∗ for the positive solution of
G(B/w) = 0.
Specifically, (B/w)∗ satisfies
IM
(
(1− e¯α)2
4
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B
w
)2
+ e¯α
B
w
− q
∗
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=
(
L+
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w
H
)(
wcB
ZXρ
)1−σ [
e¯α+
(1− e¯α)2
2
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w
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.
Taking into account the properties of G(B/w), it is straightforward to see that G(B/w) > 0 (for
positive values of B/w) if and only if B/w > (B/w)∗. Hence, we can conclude that a rise in IS
raises F (B/w, IS) if and only if B/w > (B/w)
∗. In other words, if the equilibrium value of B/w
is greater than (B/w)∗, then a further marginal rise in IS increases F (B/w, IS) and thereby
B/w. Otherwise, F (B/w, IS) and B/w go down with a rise in IS . A direct implication of this
finding is that B/w is increasing in IS on [0, wL/(wL+ q
∗H)] if and only if (B/w)0 > (B/w)∗,
where (B/w)0 is the solution of
B/w = F (B/w, 0).
That is, (B/w)0 is the equilibrium value of B/w when IS = 0 (there is no offshoring of managerial
labor).
Next, we find the condition when (B/w)0 > (B/w)∗. Since by definition (B/w)0 solves
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Figure 5: The Equilibrium Value of B/w
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B/w = F (B/w, 0), one can see that (B/w)0 > (B/w)∗ if and only if F ((B/w)∗ , 0) > (B/w)∗
(see Figure 4). We have that
F ((B/w)∗ , 0) = C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σAm
w
+
a
(
L+
(
(1−e¯α)2
4 ((B/w)
∗)2 + e¯α (B/w)∗
)
H
)
H
(
wcB
ZXρ
)1−σ [
e¯α+ (1−e¯α)
2
2 (B/w)
∗
]
+ IM
 .
As G((B/w)∗) = 0,
(
wcB
ZXρ
)1−σ [
e¯α+
(1− e¯α)2
2
(B/w)∗
]
=
IM
(
(1−e¯α)2
4 ((B/w)
∗)2 + e¯α (B/w)∗ − q∗w
)
(
L+ q
∗
wH
) .
Hence, we derive that
F ((B/w)∗ , 0) = C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σAm
w
+
a
(
L+ q
∗
wH
)
IM
 .
As a result, B/w is increasing in IS on [0, wL/(wL+ q
∗H)] if and only if
C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σAm
w
+
a
(
L+ q
∗
wH
)
IM
 > (B/w)∗ . (21)
The next step is to consider an explicit expression for (B/w)∗. We introduce the following
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notation:
D0 = IM
(1− e¯α)2
4
> 0,
D1 = IMe¯α−
(
L+
q∗
w
H
)(
wcB
ZXρ
)1−σ (1− e¯α)2
2
,
D2 =
(
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q∗
w
H
)(
wcB
ZXρ
)1−σ
e¯α+ IM
q∗
w
> 0.
Then, (B/w)∗ solves
D0 ((B/w)
∗)2 +D1 (B/w)∗ −D2 = 0,
which implies that
(B/w)∗ =
√
D21 + 4D0D2 −D1
2D0
> 0.
Thus, the inequality (21) is equivalent to
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)1−σ)
. (22)
Let us denote the right-hand side of inequality (22) by K(z), where z is 1IM . That is,
K(z) = 2
√
(e¯α−K1z)2 +
(
K2z +
q∗
w
)
(1− e¯α)2 − (e¯α−K1z)
(1− e¯α)2 −K3z,
where
K1 =
(
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q∗
w
H
)(
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ZXρ
)1−σ (1− e¯α)2
2
,
K2 =
(
L+
q∗
w
H
)(
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ZXρ
)1−σ
e¯α,
K3 = Ca
(
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q∗
w
H
)(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
.
Next, we explore the properties of the function K(z). It is straightforward to see that K(0) > 0.
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The derivative of K(z) with respect to z is given by
K ′(z) =
−2K1 (e¯α−K1z) +K2 (1− e¯α)2
(1− e¯α)2
√
(e¯α−K1z)2 +
(
K2z +
q∗
w
)
(1− e¯α)2
+
2K1
(1− e¯α)2 −K3.
Hence,
K ′(0) =
−2K1e¯α+K2 (1− e¯α)2
(1− e¯α)2
√
(e¯α)2 + q
∗
w (1− e¯α)2
+
2K1
(1− e¯α)2 −K3.
Since −2K1e¯α+K2 (1− e¯α)2 = 0,
K ′(0) =
2K1
(1− e¯α)2 −K3 > 0,
as Caρ1−σ < 1 (recall that Caρ1−σ = a/σ < 1). Thus, K(z) is increasing in a neighbourhood of
zero. Moreover, K ′(∞) is also positive, implying that K(∞) = ∞. As for any constant A the
equation K(z) = A has at most two solutions and K(∞) =∞, we can conclude that K(z) is an
increasing function of z. Here we employ the following argument: if K(z) were not increasing,
then it would have at least two local extrema (since K ′(0) > 0 and K ′(∞) > 0). In that case,
there would exist a constant A¯ such that the equation K(z) = A¯ would have at least three
solutions, which contradicts the properties of K(z).
This in turn means that the right-hand side of (22) is always positive and decreasing in IM
with its value at infinity being equal to
K(0) = 2
√
(e¯α)2 + q
∗
w (1− e¯α)2 − e¯α
(1− e¯α)2 .
As we assume that C
(
w
ZX
cB
)1−σ
Am
w > 2
√
(e¯α)2+ q
∗
w
(1−e¯α)2−e¯α
(1−e¯α)2 (see (14)), there exists a value of
IM (hereinafter denoted by IMP ) such that (22) holds if and only if IM > IMP .
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Table 1: Offshoring of Production Tasks and Decentralized Management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dependent variable: level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
normalized
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
normalized
level of
decentralization
of authority
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
sum of intrafirm imports / parental sales 0.00251** 0.00265** 0.00404*** 0.00304** 0.0247
(0.047) (0.048) (0.001) (0.048) (0.148)
intrafirm imports dummy 0.322** 1.337** 1.536**
(0.025) (0.034) (0.034)
ln parental sales 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.118*** 0.163*** 0.322** 0.108** 0.124**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
foreign competition (sample) 1.439*** 1.342*** 1.409*** 1.542*** 1.043** 1.573*** 1.807***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.025) (0.000) (0.0000)
domestic competition (sample) 0.192 0.199 0.220
(0.593) (0.556) (0.593)
foreign competition (firm) 0.499**
(0.041)
Germany dummy -0.224 -0.254 -0.167 -0.206 -0.292 -0.692* -0.198 -0.227
(0.136) (0.103) (0.325) (0.155) (0.103) (0.060) (0.291) (0.291)
industry dummies no no yes no no no no no
host country region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
first stage F -statistic 1.07 1.77 1.77
IV: standardized input -14.756 -0.272** -0.272**
(0.108) (0.014) (0.014)
observations 640 640 615 640 640 637 637 637
R-squared 0.233 0.236 0.195 0.256 0.236 - - -
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the parental firm level and p-values are in parentheses. The dependent variable decentralization of decision authority is an index that
measures the degree of decentralization in decision making, with values between 1 (decisions are taken by the CEO) and 5 (decisions are taken at the divisional level). The
normalized decentralization of decision authority is a standardized version of this index, with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1. Foreign competition (firm) is a dummy that
takes the value 1 if the firm faces many or very many foreign competitors and 0 otherwise. The instrumental variable standardized input is a dummy that indicates whether the
input supplied by the affiliate firm is standardized in quality and design. The Cragg–Donald F -statistics for weak identification are: (6) 20.88; (7) 43.51; (8) 43.19; (9) 43.19: all
are larger than 16.38 (the critical value for a 10% IV bias). *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1.
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Table 2: Offshoring of Managerial Tasks and Decentralized Management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent variable: level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
level of
decentralization
of authority
normalized
level of
decentralization
of authority
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
offshored manager dummy -0.129 -0.636**
(0.514) (0.033)
Σ # offshored managers / Σ affiliate employment -5.699*** -10.32***
(0.001) (0.001)
Σ # offshored managers / parent skilled employment 0.0102 -0.0843*** -0.0969***
(0.872) (0.000) (0.000)
interaction terms:
highly open x offshored manager dummy 0.681*
(0.063)
highly open x ( Σ # offshored managers / Σ affiliate employment) 6.066*
(0.091)
highly open x (Σ # offshored managers / parent skilled employment) 0.193*** 0.222***
(0.002) (0.002)
highly open 0.432* -0.0400 0.280 0.00710 0.359 0.00907 -0.0104
(0.071) (0.880) (0.130) (0.976) (0.134) (0.970) (0.970)
ln parental sales 0.178*** 0.183*** 0.138** 0.132** 0.226*** 0.248*** 0.285***
(0.329) (0.340) (0.255) (0.245) (0.402) (0.442) (0.442)
Germany dummy -0.0581 -0.0653 0.189 0.0618 -0.266 -0.261 -0.299
(0.827) (0.807) (0.425) (0.802) (0.420) (0.405) (0.405)
industry dummies no no no no no no no
host country region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 474 474 454 454 410 410 410
R-squared 0.174 0.196 0.230 0.246 0.181 0.265 0.265
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the parental firm level and p-values are in parentheses. The dependent variable decentralization of decision authority is an index that measures the degree
of decentralization in decision making, with values between 1 (decisions are taken by the CEO) and 5 (decisions are taken at the divisional level). The normalized decentralization of decision
authority is a standardized version of this index, with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1.
The variable highly open is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the firm operates in an industry with very many foreign competitors and 0 otherwise. Managerial offshoring: Offshored manager
dummy is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm offshored managers to the affiliate. Σ # offshored managers / Σ affiliate employment is the total number of offshored managers
relative to the total employment over all affiliates; Σ # offshored managers / parent skilled employment is the total number of offshored managers relative to the number of university graduates
employed in the parental firm. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1.
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Table 3: Trade in Tasks and Executive Compensation Relative to Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dependent variable: ln (CEO compensation / average firm wage)
openn. openn. openn.
<40th pctl. <40th pctl. <10th pctl.
sum of intrafirm imports / parental sales 0.00867 0.0122*** 0.0100*** 0.0125*** 0.00919***
(0.247) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
offshored manager dummy -0.305
(0.257)
# offshored managers -0.0690* -0.0499* -0.0987** -0.0717**
(0.055) (0.070) (0.021) (0.025)
∆ establishments ’97–’98 0.0220*** 0.0229***
(0.008) (0.002)
less open -0.139 -0.368 -0.836**
(0.636) (0.331) (0.029)
less open x # offshored managers 0.0765 0.121***
(0.138) (0.001)
ln parental sales -0.0310 -0.0479 0.0597 0.0506 0.130
(0.870) (0.807) (0.525) (0.580) (0.255)
Germany dummy 1.137 0.809 0.220 0.222 0.00898
(0.181) (0.203) (0.556) (0.542) (0.982)
industry dummies no no no no no
host country region dummies no no no no no
observations 61 56 120 120 120
R-squared 0.457 0.626 0.170 0.200 0.248
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the parental firm level and p-values are in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable ln (average executive wage relative to average firm wage) is the natural logarithm of the
average executive wage relative to the average wage paid in the multinational parent. The variable less
open is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the firm is within the 40th or 10th percentile, respectively,
of the openness distribution. Offshored manager dummy is a dummy variable that indicates whether the
firm offshored managers to the affiliate. # offshored managers is the number of managers offshored to the
affiliate firm. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
variable: obs. mean min max std. dev. obs. with
dummy
=1/=0
Decentralized Management:
level of decentralization of authority 1161 2.83 1 5 0.87 -
normalized level of decentralization of authority 1161 0.00 -2.10 2.50 1 -
Offshoring of Production Tasks:
intrafirm imports in percent of parent firm’s sales 1957 8.37 0 560.00 34.72 -
intrafirm imports 1995 0.39 0 1 0.49 776 / 1219
IV: standardized input 2073 0.61 0 1 0.49 1273 / 800
Offshoring of Managerial Tasks:
manager sent 809 0.43 0 1 0.49 345 / 464
offshored manager dummy = 1 - manager sent 809 0.57 0 1 0.49 464 / 345
Σ # offshored managers / Σ affiliate employment 797 0.047 0 0.479 0.066 -
Σ # offshored managers / parent skilled employment 685 1.48 0 13.6 2.49 -
# offshored managers 731 2.63 0 39 3.73 -
Competition and Trade Openness:
foreign competition (firm) 2010 0.82 0 1 0.38 1657 / 353
foreign competition (sample) 2122 0.82 0 1 0.21 -
domestic competition (sample) 2120 0.57 0 1 0.28 -
highly open 2122 0.74 0 1 0.44 1566 / 556
less open (below 10th percentile) 2122 0.074 0 1 0.263 158 / 1964
less open (below 40th percentile) 2122 0.46 0 1 0.50 972 / 1150
∆ establishments ’97–’98 1021 -91.76 -1357 313 155.78 -
Human Resources:
CEO compensation in EUR 767 869,756 17,767 5,066,667 906,156 -
firm wages in EUR 1586 57,659 1816 566,867 45,813 -
CEO compensation / average firm wage 561 15.00 0.29 143.12 21.02 -
ln (CEO compensation / average firm wage) 561 2.22 -1.23 4.96 0.94 -
Control Variables:
ln parental sales 1733 18.80 13.24 24.78 2.09 -
Germany dummy 2123 0.56 0 1 0.50 1186 / 937
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Table 5: Variable Descriptions
variable:
Decentralized Management:
level of decentralization of authority index that measures the degree of decentralization in decision making
at the parent firm with values between 1 (decisions are taken at the
top by the CEO/owner) and 5 (decisions are taken at the divisional
level); the index is the mean value of decentralization of 16 (for German
parents) or 13 (for Austrian parents) types of corporate decisions. These
include decisions on acquisitions, new strategies, transfer pricing, human
resources, R&D expenditure, new products, financing, budget, hiring
and firing personnel.
normalized level of decentralization of authority z-score of the decentralization index: rescales the index to a mean of
0 and a standard deviation of 1; each value of this normalized index
indicates its difference from the mean of the original decentralization
index in number of standard deviations (of the original index)
Offshoring of Production Tasks:
intrafirm imports in percent of parent firm’s sales sum of all intrafirm imports that a parent firm sources from its affiliates
relative to the size of the parent firm (measured by the parent’s domestic
sales) multiplied by 100%
intrafirm imports dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm has intrafirm imports
from at least one of its affiliates and 0 otherwise
IV: standardized input dummy that takes the value 1 if the affiliate firm supplies a good that
is standardized in both, quality and design and 0 otherwise
Offshoring of Managerial Tasks:
offshored manager dummy dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm does not send managers
to the affiliate firm and 0 otherwise
Σ # offshored managers / Σ affiliate employment sum of managers that work in all affiliate firms and are not sent from
the parent firm relative to the total employment in all affiliate firms
Σ # offshored managers / parent skilled employment sum of all managers that work in affiliate firms and are not sent from
the parent firm relative to the number of university graduates employed
in the parent firm
# offshored managers number of managers in the affiliate firm that are not sent from the parent
(absolute)
Competition and Trade Openness:
foreign competition (firm) dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm faces many or very
many foreign competitors and 0 otherwise
foreign competition (sample) average of the dummy foreign competition (firm) at the ISIC 3 digit level
domestic competition (sample) average of the dummy domestic competition (firm) at the ISIC 3 digit
level
highly open dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm operates in an ISIC 3
digit industry that is above the 25th percentile of foreign competition
(sample)
less open (below 10th percentile) dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm operates in an ISIC 3
digit industry that is below the 10th percentile of foreign competition
(sample)
less open (below 40th percentile) dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm operates in an ISIC 3
digit industry that is below the 40th percentile of foreign competition
(sample)
∆ establishments ’97–’98 change in the number of establishments between 1997 and 1998 within
the sector and home country of the parent firm; 4 digit information is
used wherever available if not then 3 or 2 digit information is used; data
source: INDSTAT4 2013
Human Resources:
CEO compensation / average firm wage average executive compensation of executive board members relative to
the average employee wage of the parent firm; data sources: average
executive compensation is obtained from Kienbaum and additionally
hand-collected from annual reports of the firms; whenever only consol-
idated reports were available from a superordinated entity, executive
payments are obtained from there; average employee wages come from
the firm survey
Control Variables:
ln parental sales natural logarithm of the parent firm’s domestic sales in EUR
Germany dummy dummy that takes the value 1 if the parent firm is located in Germany
and 0 if the parent firm is located in Austria
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